University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 2 Spring 1994

Article 3

1994

Suits against State Officials for Damages for
Violations of Constitutional Rights: Comparing
Maryland and Federal Law
Stephen J. Shapiro
University of Baltimore School of Law, sshapiro@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Shapiro, Stephen J. (1994) "Suits against State Officials for Damages for Violations of Constitutional Rights: Comparing Maryland and
Federal Law," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 23: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol23/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

SUITS AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS
FOR DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: COMPARING MARYLAND
AND FEDERAL LAW

Stephen J. Shapiro t

I. ·INTRODUCTION

In the 1961 case of Monroe v. Pape, I the United States Supreme
Court allowed the use of a one hundred year old federal statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1983,2 (hereinafter Section 1983) to award damages to a
plaintiff whose constitutional rights had been violated by members
of the Chicago Police Department. 3 This ruling, coupled with the
expansion of constitutional rights which occurred during the 1960s,4
has led to what some commentators have termed an "explosion" of

t
1.
2.

3.
4.

Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A.,
Havefford College, 1971; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1976.
365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
This statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
See supra notes 1-2, infra notes 37-41, 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing
the Monroe case).
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (strengthening
free speech rights of students); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (strengthening citizens' freedom of speech and of the press); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (strengthening citizens' right to free exercise of
religion);. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (reaffirming every citizen's right
to vote free from impairment by arbitrary state action). This general expansion
of constitutional rights did not end abruptly, but continued, at least to a
certain extent, beyond 1970. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(expanding the constitutional right to privacy to include the right to an
abortion).
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federal lawsuits to redress violations of constitutional rights. 5
Recently, the Supreme Court has been less willing to expand the
scope of many constitutional rights, 6 and has, in fact, cut back on
the reach of others. 7 This has led some civil rights litigants to turn
to state courts in the hope of receiving broader rights under state
constitutions. 8
.
In Maryland, the court of appeals has not expanded the scope
of rights under the Maryland Declaration of Rights 9 beyond the scope
5. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1980); see
also Wayne McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REV. 1 (1974)
(stating that "private rights of actions based on 42 U .S.C. § 1983 are flooding
the federal courts"). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642, 68995 (1987) (maintaining that although the overall number of civil rights cases
has greatly increased, that most of this increase can be attributed to suits
brought under new civil rights statutes such as Title VII, and to prisoners'
habeas corpus petitions; as a result, the increase in what he terms "Constitutional Tort Claims"-suits for damages for violation of constitutional rightshave had only a very modest increase).
6. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (refusing to
extend special First Amendment protection to personal opinions); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to extend constitutional protection to
private, consensual, homosexual activity); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984) (refusing to extend Fourth Amendment privacy rights to prisoners).
Nevertheless, there have been cases within the last 10 years where the Court
has expanded constitutional rights. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (extending First Amendment protection to flag burning); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (expanding rights of fleeing felons).
7. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.·Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (confirming a
state's power to restrict a woman's right to an abortion); Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (restricting the right to free exercise of religion);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (restricting the First
Amendment rights of students).
8. See James G. Exum, Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1741
(1992) (arguing that a state court interpreting its constitution may give greater,
but not lesser, protection to individual liberties than required by the United
States Constitution); Daniel R. Gordon, Progressives Retreat: Falling Back
from the Federal Constitution to State Constitutions, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801,
815 (1991) (arguing that progressives should take their constitutional litigation
to state courts to avoid federal court conservatism). This trend was accelerated
by an influential article by former Supreme Court Justice William Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV.
489 (1977), which has been referred to as the "Magna Carta of state constitutional law." Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of
Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983). Burt Neuborne,
who argued in 1977 that federal courts were more suited to protect individual
rights, Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977),
has more recently espoused the importance of state constitutions. Burt Neuborne, Forward: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 901 (1989).
9. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. arts. 1-46 (1867).
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of their counterparts under the federal Bill of Rights. 1O Therefore, a
plaintiff wishing to sue a state official for a violation of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights would often gain no substantive advantage by
filing the suit in a Maryland state court rather than in a federal
court. 11 Differences do exist between Maryland and federal courts,
however, in the extent of immunities from damages afforded defendants.12 These differences may give plaintiffs filing in Maryland state
court a distinct advantage over those filing in federal court when
bringing suit against a state official for violations of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.
In a number of rulings interpreting Section 1983 itself, as opposed to the constitutional rights it protects, the Supreme Court has
limited the scope of this remedy. 13 The result of such rulings has
been that in some cases, even if plaintiffs prove that government
officials have violated their constitutional rights, they are left without
a statutory remedy. 14
.
Suits against state and local officials under Section 1983 are
classified either as official capacity or· personal capacity suits. IS Of10. "[TJhe Constitution of Maryland and the Constitution of the United States
have been construed similarly with respect to many individual rights." Charles
A. Rees, State Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Individual Civil
Rights, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 299 (1978). Many provisions of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, violation of which could lead to a damage lawsuit, have
been read in pari materia with their federal counterparts. For example, Article
40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights has been equated with the free
speech provision of the First Amendment. Landover Books, Inc. v. Prince
George's County, 81 Md. App. 54, 76, 566 A.2d 792, 803-04 (1989). The Due
Process Clauses of the two Constitutions are to be given similar, although not
necessarily identical, interpretations. Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md.
683, 704-05, 426 A.2d 929, 941 (1981). Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court should be treated as "persuasive authority" when interpreting the
Maryland Due Process Clause. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ.,
295 Md. 597, 640, 458 A.2d 758, 781 (1983). The Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures is read in pari materia with Article
26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 322,
430 A.2d 49, 55 (1981), and no greater protection should be extended under
the Maryland provision. Henderson v. State, 89 Md. App. 19, 24, 597 A.2d
486, 488 (1991), cert. denied, 325 Md. 396, 601 A.2d 129 (1992).
11. There may, of course, sometimes be a substantive advantage to bringing suit
under the Maryland Constitution, such as where there is no corresponding
federal right, e.g., there is an Equal Rights Amendment under the Maryland
Constitution but not under the federal, or where the federal right has been
held not applicable to the states, e.g., the right to a trial by jury in a civil
action under the Seventh Amendment.
12. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 47, 50-51, 64 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 27-30, 86-88 and accompanying text.
15. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469
U.S. 464, 471 (1985).
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ficial capacity suits are brought against government officials who are
merely carrying out their duties under an unconstitutional statute or
rule. 16 Damages in such suits are collected from the government
treasuryY Official capacity suits are comparable to suits against the
government itself. ls Damages may be assessed against local government officials acting in their official capacity, or against the local
governments themselves. 19 No damages may be awarded, however,
in suits against state officials acting in their official capacity. 20
Personal capacity suits are brought against government officials
who exceed or abuse their authority under state or locallaw. 21 Under
Section 1983, officials who exceed or abuse their authority under
state or local law can be held personally liable for damages. 22 The
damages are limited, however, by various immunities. 23 Some officials, such as judges, legislators, and prosecutors, enjoy absolute
immunity from damages. 24 Most other officials and employees receive
qualified, or limited, immunity from damages. 25 Officials with qualified immunity may be held liable only for actions which violated
the "settled constitutional rights" of the plaintiff at the time of the
action. 26

16. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
17. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166.
It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in
interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an
official in his personal capacity can be executed. only against the
official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages
judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government
entity itself.
[d.
18. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. "[AI suit against a state official in his or her official

19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's
office." Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,471 (1985). "As such, it is no different
from a suit against the State itself." [d.
Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
See Will, 491 U.S. at 67, 71. If brought in federal court, such suits are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
If brought under § 1983 in state court, they are barred because the state is
not considered a "person" under § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961), overruled on other grounds
by Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
[d. at 166-67.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951) (legislators); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
[d. at 818.

1994]

Suits Against State Officials

427

In sum, plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated
by state officials have no remedy under federal law 27 in the following
situations:
(1) When the violation was committed by a state official acting
in an official capacity;28
(2) when the violation was committed by an official acting in a
judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial capacity;29 or
(3) when the violation was committed by any other official acting
in an individual capacity, unless the right had previously been clearly
defined by settled law. 30
Several opinions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, however,
have indicated that the identical circumstances might lead to recovery
in Maryland state courtS.31 Although there is no statutory counterpart
to Section 1983 in Maryland, the court of appeals has recognized a
common-law right of action for violations of certain sections of the
Maryland Declaration of RightsY In suits for damages against individual government officials based on violations of constitutional
rights, Maryland does not recognize a distinction between suits against
officials in their individual versus their official capacities. 33 Damages
may be awarded against the official personally in both instances. 34
Also, Maryland does not seem to recognize a qualified immunity for
state officials. 35 These two differences between Maryland and federal
law may make it possible for plaintiffs to recover in Maryland courts
under some of the circumstances where recovery is not allowed under
federal law.
This Article will examine the scope of the Maryland rulings in
suits against state officials and will compare the results under Maryland law with the results under federal law . It can then be determined
in what instances these differences might lead plaintiffs to file suit
in Maryland state court rather than federal court. This Article will
further explore some questions left unanswered by the Maryland
opinions, including: possible unfairness to individual defendants, the
role of the State Tort Claims Act,36 the effect of the rulings on the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.

35.
36.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 24, infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26, infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 597 A.2d 432 (1991); Clea v. City
Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988).
Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 535, 479 A.2d 921, 929
(1984).
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 374-75, 597 A.2d at 446-47 (1991).
[d. at 374, 597 A.2d at 446.
[d. at 373, 597 A.2d at 446.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (1993 & Supp. 1994).

[Vol. 23
428
Baltimore Law Review
absolute immunity of certain officials, and the application of these
principles in cases involving claims under both state and federal law.

II.

FEDERAL LAW
In the 1961 decision of Monroe v. Pape,37 the Supreme Court
held that Section 1983 provided a damage remedy against members
of the Chicago Police Department who had violated the plaintiffs'
. constitutional rights.38 In Monroe, thirteen police officers entered
and ransacked a private home without a search warrant and detained
the owner for ten hours without an arrest warrant. 39 The Court found
that the defendants had acted "under color of" state law, despite
the fact that their actions exceeded their official authority and, in
fact, were in violation of state law. 40 The Court refused to impose a
state of mind requirement that the defendants' acts be "wilfully"
done, stating that Section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions. "41
Despite this broad statement, it has not always been possible to
hold government officials and governments responsible for the natural
consequences of their actions. Plaintiffs injured by the unconstitutional acts of government officials have been left without damage
remedies because the Supreme Court has placed a number of restrictions on Section 1983. 42 Some of these restrictions relate to suits
against governmental entities themselves or, similarly, against governmental officers in their official capacity.43 A different set of
restrictions apply when suit is brought against governmental officers
in their individual capacity. 44 It is useful to discuss these two lines
of decisions separately.

A.

Ojjicial Capacity Suits
In Monroe v. Pape,45 the plaintiffs sued not only the thirteen

Chicago police officers who had broken into their home, but also
37. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
38. [d.
39. [d. at 169.
40. [d. at 187. "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law,
is action taken 'under color of' state law." [d. at 184 (quoting United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941».
41. [d. at 187.
42. See infra notes 47, 50-51 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part II.A.
44. See infra Part II.B.
45. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Social
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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the City of Chicago. 46 The Court held that the city was not a proper
defendant, since municipalities were not "persons" under Section
1983. 47
The Court's Monroe holding remained the law until 1978 when
the Court reversed itself, in Monell v. Department of Social Services
oj New York,48 by holding that local governmental entities could be
sued under Section 1983. 49 Local governments can only be held liable
when the government's "official policy" causes the violation. 50 Moreover, the governmental entity cannot be held liable on a respondeat
superior theory for the action of its employees and non-policy-making
officials. 51
Although there has been much litigation concerning what constitutes official government policy, the Court has continued to require
that a violation be caused by official policy for recovery against
municipal governments. 52 This requirement presents certain difficulties
46. Id. at 169-70.
47. Id. at 187-91, overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court took this position as a matter of
statutory construction, despite the fact that the Dictionary Act provided that
"the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate."
Act of February 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 431. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
relied heavily on the defeat of Senator Sherman's Amendment to the original
§ 1983, Act of April 20, 1871. This amendment would have made the inhabitants
of the county, city, or parish, in which certain acts of violence occurred, liable
to pay full compensation to the person damaged or his widow or legal
representative. The Monroe Court held that "[t)he response of the Congress
to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought
within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that
we cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to
include them." Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
48. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
49. Id. at 683. The Court reexamined the meaning of the defeat of the Sherman
Amendment, holding that this showed only that Congress did not want municipalities to be held liable merely because the violation took place within its
borders: a duty to keep the peace. However, "nothing said in debate on the
Sherman Amendment would have prevented holding a municipality liable under
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
50. Id. at 694. "[I)t is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983." Id.
51. Id. at 691. "[W)e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tort feasor-or , in other words, a municipality cannot be
held liable under § 1983 ·on a respondeat superior theory." Id. (emphasis
added).
52. See, e.g., Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (finding that an ad hoc
decision by official with policy-making authority constitutes official policy);
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (finding that only actions
of those with policy-making authority under state law constitute official government policy).
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where the violations, although carried out by an official performing
his or her official duties, were not caused by a specific government
policy. The only recovery in such cases would be against the official
in his or her "individual capacity." 53 There are several problems with
such individual capacity suits. First, the official may enjoy absolute
or qualified immunity from an assessment of damages, thereby
blocking a judgment against him.54 Second, even if a judgment were
obtained, the official might not have the resources to satisfy it. 55
Under either scenario, a plaintiff whose constitutional rights have
been violated by a local government official might be left uncompensated.
The situation is worse when the suit is against a state, or a state
official acting in an official capacity. According to the Eleventh
Amendment,56 states may not be sued in federal court absent their
consentY Therefore, plaintiffs generally may not sue states in federal
court under Section 1983 for constitutional violations caused by
official state policy. 58
53. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 24-26, infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
55. Many municipalities, however, do provide either indemnification or insurance
against such judgments for their employees. This protects the employees from·
unfairness and provides the plaintiffs with a source of funds for recovery.
There are, however, often limits on the amount of such insurance or indemnification. See PETER Low & JOHN JEFFRIES, CrvIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 49 (1988).
56. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
57. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 3 (1890). Although the Eleventh Amendment,
by its terms, seems only to prohibit suits against a state by a citizen of another
state or of a foreign state, it has consistently been interpreted also to prohibit
suits by citizens of the same state. Id. at 15. A state may, however, waive its
Eleventh Amendment protection and consent to suit in federal court. Id. at
17; Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). Such consent may be made
by the state legal representative or by statutes. Such statutes will be narrowly
construed. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573,
579 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 465-66
(1945).
58. The Hans Court rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amendment did not
bar suits for constitutional violations. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 10-15
(1890). However, four Supreme Court Justices and several commentators have
taken the position that the Eleventh Amendment bars only diversity suits, not
suits based on constitutional violations. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 260-80 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting, joined by Blackmun,
Marshall, and Stevens, 11.); see also, Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
515 (1977); Frederic S. LeClerq, State Immunity and Federal Judicial PowerRetreat from National Supremacy, 27 FLA. L. REV. 361, 381-83 (1975); Peter
W. Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND.
L.J. 293 (1980).
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In Edelman v. Jordan,59 the plaintiffs attempted to circumvent
the Eleventh Amendment by suing the state officials responsible for
carrying out state policy instead of the state itself. 60 Instead of
administering the programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
(AABD) in accordance with federal regulations, the officials were
following Illinois regulations which allowed the Department of Public
Aid to delay paying AABD benefits longer than federal law permitted. 61 The plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling t.he defendants to turn over all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld. 62 Relief
was not granted because the damages sought would be paid out of
the state treasury, not the personal assets of the state officials. 63 The
Court held that when the damages sought will be paid out of a
state's treasury, suits against public officials are "official capacity"
actions and are to be treated as actions against the state itself.64
Congress does have the power to waive the protections of the
Eleventh Amendment when using its power under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 65 The Supreme Court has held, however,
that such waivers must be explicit. 66 The Court has further held that
Congress did not intend to waive the states' Eleventh Amendment
protection by the passage of Section 1983. 67

59. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
60. /d. at 653.
61. /d. at 655.
62. /d. at 656. The plaintiffs requested that the Court grant equitable restitution

63.

64.
65.

66.
67.

rather than damages, in order to fall within the doctrine of Ex parte Young,
which allowed suits for injunctive (equitable) relief against state officials. The
Court in Edelman refused to accept this argument, holding that because the
suit was for retrospective relief and would involve money coming from the
state treasury to compensate for past wrongs, it did not fall within the Ex
parte Young exception. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666-68.
[d. at 663. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit, however, if the state
official is sued for prospective, injunctive relief, ordering him or her to comply
with the United States Constitution. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56
(1908). In suits for injunctive relief, a state official alleged to be acting in
violation of the Constitution is "stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct." [d. at 160. The Court has been unwilling, however, to extend the
reasoning of Ex parte Young to allow suits for retrospective monetary relief,
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 655, or to suits to enjoin violations of state law.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-56 (1976). To reach this conclusion
the Court interpreted section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides
that "[t]he Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 474
(1987).
Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979).
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In Will v. Michigan Department oj State Police,68 the plaintiff
attempted to overcome Eleventh Amendment restrictions by suing
state officials in their official capacity under Section 1983 in Michigan
state court, rather than in federal court. 69 The Eleventh Amendment
does not apply to state courts; therefore, suit was not barred on this
ground. 70 Nevertheless, the Court held that neither a state, nor a
state official acting in an official capacity, is considered a "person"
for purposes of a Section 1983 damages action. 71 As with decisions
under the Eleventh Amendment,. the distinction between official
capacity suits for damages, which are not allowed, and individual
capacity suits, which may be allowed in some circumstances, is
whether the suit is in reality against the state or the individual,
regardless of how it is characterized. 72

B.

Individual Capacity Suits
When the constitutional violation is not caused by government
policy, but by the actions of an individual official, the suit is
considered a "personal-capacity action. "73 Defendants in such cases
are usually accused of acting outside the scope of their authority or
in violation of state law. Damage awards in such cases can be
executed only against the official's personal assets, and not against
the government. 74
All governmental officials, however, enjoy some form of immunity from damages in a Section 1983 action. 75 Some officials have
absolute immunity from damages. 76 This immunity is available regardless of the good or bad faith of the official, the egregious nature
68. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
69. [d. at 71.
70. [d. at 63-64.
71. [d. at 71. The Court did, however, distinguish suits for injunctive relief, for

72.
73.

74.
75.

76.

which state officials acting in their official capacity would be considered
persons. [d. at 71 n.lO. This is in line with the doctrine of Ex parte Young,
which held that such suits are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
supra discussion at notes 62-63.
Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464
(1985).
Graham, 473 U.S. at 167-68.
Section 1983 itself does not contain any mention of immunities. The Supreme
Court, however, looking at the legislative history of the statute determined
that "[tJhe legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to
abolish wholesale all common-law immunities." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967). Most public officials, therefore, receive similar immunities to that
which they would have received at common law. See supra notes 24, 25 and
accompanying text for officials who are granted immunity from damages
actions.
See supra note 24.
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of the violation, or society's reverence for the constitutional right
which was violated. 77 These officials will never be held liable for any
violation of rights occurring from the exercise of their duties. 78
Most governmental officials receive "qualified" immunity from
damages. 79 Thus, they are protected from liability unless their actions
violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known. "80 In order for a plaintiff
to recover damages, the courts must have recognized the right at the
time of the violation, and it must have been sufficiently well established that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would
have been aware of it. 81
The main purpose of such immunities is to allow government
officials to act without being paralyzed by the fear of personal
liability.82 But the immunities, especially absolute immunity, have
been criticized for providing too much protection to government
officials and leaving some plaintiffs without a remedy for constitutional violations. 83 Even qualified immunities have been criticized for
77. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 363-64 (1978). In Stump, the
Supreme Court upheld the immunity of a state judge who had ordered the
sterilization of an unrepresented minor who was told that she was going to
have an appendectomy. The Court described the immunity in the broadest
possible terms: "This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of
acting maliciously and corruptly." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
The immunity is lost only if the judge acts in the "clear absence of all
jurisdiction," Stump, 435 U.S. at 357, or becomes only a qualified immunity
when the judge is exercising a non-judicial, administrative function. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
78. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-18 (1976).
79. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governors and other executive officials); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 547 (1967) (police officers).
80. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
81. This so called "objective" standard replaced an earlier subjective standard,
which required the official to demonstrate a "good-faith belief" in the legality
of his or her actions. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 248. The Court abandoned the
subjective good faith standard for the objective one because they felt that
"bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials
either to the costs of trial or to ·the burdens of broad-reaching discovery"
which would necessarily delve into their "subjective motivation." Harlow, 457
U.S. at 817-18.
82. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240. The Court has recognized that without at least
qualified immunity the threat of liability would deter a public official from
the "willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment
required by the public good." Id. Another rationale for the immunities is to
avoid "the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to
liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to
exercise discretion." Id.
83. Irene Merker Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity, 64 VA. L. REV. 833, 853-58 (1978); Jon Evan Waddoups, Narrowing
the Scope of Absolute Judicial Immunity from Section 1983 Suits: The Bar
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protecting defendants in situations where they do not deserve it. 84
Supreme Court precedent has held that unless plaintiff's rights have
been sufficiently well established to avoid an immunity, the immunity
remains in force regardless of any bad-faith motivation by the
defendant and regardless of whether the defendant's action violated
established state law guidelines. 85
C.

Resulting Restrictions on Recovery

These personal immunities, when coupled with the rest net IOns
on recovery from state and local governments, result in the following
situations where plaintiffs have been injured through the unconstitutional actions of state officials, but no compensation, either from
the state or from the individual, will be awarded:
(1) When the constitutional violation is caused by a state statute
or policy;86 or
(2) when the constitutional violation is not caused by state statute
or policy and
(a) is committed by an official, such as a judge or prosecutor, enjoying absolute immunity;87 or
(b) is committed by any official if the plaintiff's constitutional right was not clearly established by the courts before the
violation. 88
III.

MARYLAND LAW

The Maryland Declaration of Rights 89 contains numerous articles
that parallel provisions in the federal Bill of Rights,90 such as a free

84.

85.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Grievance Committee and the Judicial Function, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1245
(Summer 1990)' (arguing against extending absolute immunity to bar grievance
committees).
Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting
the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 115, 140-57, 195 (1991);
David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 23, 77-80 (1989); Stephen J. Shapiro, Public Officials' Qualified Immunity
in Section 1983 Actions under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and its Progeny: A Critical
Analysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 249, 266-74 (1989).
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-97 (1984).
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
MD. CODE ANN., CONST. arts. 1-46 (1981).
U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII.
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speech provision,91 a due process clause,92 and a search and seizure
clause. 93 Although many of the Maryland articles are worded quite
differently than their federal counterparts,94 the Maryland court of
appeals has mainly interpreted most Maryland articles in pari materia
with the corresponding federal provisions. 95 The court of appeals has
held that United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting the
federal Bill of Rights are "persuasive" when interpreting the Maryland Constitution. 96
Although there is no statutory remedy in Maryland similar to
Section 1983 for violations of rights provided by the Maryland
Constitution, the court of appeals has held that a common-law action
for damages is available for such violations. 97 In setting forth the

91. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 40 (1981). "That the liberty of the press ought
to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed
to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that privilege." [d.
92. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 24 (1981). "That no man ought to be taken or
imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land." [d.
93. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 26 (1981).
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected
places, or to seize any person or property, are grievious [sic) and
oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to
apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place,
or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be" granted.

[d.
94. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 40 (1981) (Maryland Declaration of
Rights), supra note 91, with the free speech provision of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Compare MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 24 (1981) (Maryland Declaration of
Rights), supra note 92, with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "[N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Compare MD.
CODE ANN., CONST. art. 26 (1981) (Maryland Declaration of Rights), supra
note 93, with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The Right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95. See Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 532, 479 A.2d 921,
927 (1984).
96. See id.
97. In Widgeon, 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921 (1984), the court found that a
common-law action for damages was available to redress violations of Articles
24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (the due process and search
and seizure clauses, respectively). [d. at 537-38, 479 A.2d at 930. The court
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guidelines for common-law actions against state officials, the court
of appeals has established different standards of liability than those
in a Section 1983 action. 98

A.

Ritchie v. Donnelly

The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Ritchie v. Donnelly,99
recently restated the law concerning liability of the state and its
officials for violations of the state constitution. loo In Ritchie, the
plaintiff, who had been dismissed as a deputy sheriff in Howard
County, sued the county sheriff in a Maryland circuit court. IOI Ritchie
brought a cause of action under Section 1983 for violations of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal Constitution .102 Ritchie 'also brought state causes of action for violations of
Article 24, the due process clause, and Article 46, the equal rights
amendment, of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as well as various
non-constitutional state tort claims. 103
The trial court, in an action that was affirmed by the court of
special appeals,I04 dismissed the plaintiff's Section 1983 claims because
the claims were against the sheriff in her official capacity.105 The
trial court reasoned that under federal law, state officials lO6 acting in

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.

105.
106.

reviewed numerous cases where such actions had been allowed in the past. Id.
at 525-32, 479 A.2d at 923-27. Although the court limited its holding to Articles
24 and 26, Id. at 537, 479 A.2d at 930, there is nothing inherent in the
reasoning of the Widgeon case that would so limit the rational. In fact, the
holding has been extended to the Maryland equal rights amendment, Article
46, which states that "[e]quality of rights under law shall not be abridged or
denied because of sex." MD. CODE ANN., CaNST. art. 46 (1981) (applied in
Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 597 A.2d 432 (1991». There is no reason
to believe that the holding will not be extended to other rights provided by
the Maryland Constitution.
See infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
324 Md. 344, 597 A.2d 432 (1991).
Id. at 373-75, 597 A.2d at 446-47.
Id. at 349-50, 597 A.2d at 434-35.
Id. at 350, 597 A. 2d at 434-35.
Id. The plaintiff's original complaint contained counts of sexual discrimination,
abusive discharge, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
violations of Articles 24 and 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at
350, 597 A.2d at 434. Her complaint was later amended to include alleged
violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses' of the Fourteenth
Amendment and a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 350, 597
A.2d at 435.
The court of special appeals issued an unreported opinion. Id. at 351, 597
A.2d at 435.
Id. at 351, 597 A.2d at 435.
The lower court held, in an unreported opinion, that the sheriff of Howard
County was a state official, rather than a local official. Id. at 352, 597 A.2d
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their official capacity are not subject to Section 1983 liability.107 The
court of appeals, after an extensive review of the differences between
official and individual capacity suits under Section 1983,108 reversed
the dismissal on the grounds that the lower courts had applied the
wrong standard and had incorrectly labeled an individual capacity
suit as an official capacity suit. 109
As to the state constitutional claims, the trial court dismissed
both claims, again relying on the distinction between official and
individual capacity suits. The court held that this was an official
capacity suit and therefore barred by sovereign immunity.11O The
court of special appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, but
again relied on the distinction between individual and official capacity
suits. III The court of appeals held that state law does not allow
bifurcation of claims into individual capacity and official capacity. I 12
All claims are treated as if they were against the official personally,
and therefore the sovereign immunity defense to a federal Section
1983 claim is not allowed in a similar suit relying on Maryland law.

B.

The Official Capacity Versus Individual Capacity Distinction
Similar to the federal government, the state itself is immune
from suit for constitutional violations. l13 The doctrine of sovereign

107.
108.
109.
110.
III.
112.
113.

at 435. The court of appeals noted that under Maryland law, a sheriff is a
state official. ld. at 357, 597 A.2d at 438. The court also recognized that state
law is not dispositive for purposes of a § 1983 action, and that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the case of Dotson v.
Chester, 937 F.2d 920, 926·27 (4th Cir. 1991), suggested that a sheriff may be
considered a local government official for some purposes. Ritchie, 324 Md. at
357, 597 A.2d at 438.
The court of appeals held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the
sheriff had been acting as a state rather than local official. ld. Both the
plaintiff and the defendant had argued that the sheriff was acting as a state
official, for purposes of both the § 1983 claims and the state law claims. ld.
at 357-58, 597 A.2d at 438. The court of special appeals ruled that the defendant
was a state official, thereby barring 'the plaintiff's § 1983 action. ld. Because
the plaintiff did not challenge this holding, and because she had expressly
stated in her brief that the defendant was acting as a state official, the court
assumed in deciding the case that the sheriff was acting as a state official. ld.
at 358, 597 A.2d at 438.
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 351-52, 597 A.2d at 435.
ld. at 358-66, 597 A.2d at 439-42.
ld. at 368, 597 A.2d at 443.
ld. at 368, 597 A.2d at 444.
ld.
ld. at 375, 597 A.2d at 446-47.
ld. at 369, 597 A.2d at 444. "The theory that, in the absence of a statute, the
State itself cannot be held liable in damages for acts which are unconstitutional
rests on public policy and a theoretical notion of the 'State.'" ld. at 369, 597
A.2d at 444 (citing Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 654, 73 A. 261, 263
(1909».
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immunity precludes any damages actions against the state, absent
legislation consenting to SUit. 114 At this point, however, federal and
state law diverge. Under federal law, the prohibition against suing
the state for damages cannot be evaded by merely naming the state
official responsible for implementing state policy.115 If the official
was merely carrying out state policy, and it was such policy that was
the moving force behind the violation, then the suit would be deemed
an official capacity action and would not be allowed. 116
Maryland, however, does not recognize the distinction between
official and individual capacity suits. 117 The court in Ritchie reiterated
that it had "consistently held that a public official who violates the
plaintiff's rights under the Maryland Constitution is personally liable
for compensatory damages." 118 Liability may be imposed whether
the unconstitutional actions "were in accordance with or dictated by
government policy or custom"-official capacity, or if the unconstitutional acts were "inconsistent with government policy or custom"- '
individual capacity. I 19
C.

Allowance oj Individual Immunities

The Ritchie court stated that a defendant who violates a plaintiff's state constitutional rights "does not have the qualified immunity
defense available in a § 1983 action." 120 The court cited Clea v. City
oj Baltimore, 121 a 1988 court of appeals decision, in which a police
officer was held personally liable for an unconstitutional search of
the plaintiff's home. 122 The officer, due to a mistake on his part,
applied for a search warrant for the wrong house and searched the
114. [d. at 369, 597 A.2d at 444; see also Department of Natural Resources v.

115.
116.
117.

118.

119.
120.

121.
122.

Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 66, 521 A.2d 313, 319 (1986); Dunne v. State, 162 Md.
274, 284-87, 159 A. 751, 755-56, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 564 (1932); Weyler v.
Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 654, 73 A. 261, 263 (1909).
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663 (1974).
See supra notes 59-64.
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 368, 597 A.2d at 144. "Both the defendant's arguments
and the decision of the Court of Special Appeals assume than an official!
individual capacity distinction, like that under § 1983, exists with regard to
actions against individual public officials for damages grounded upon alleged
violations of Maryland constitutional rights. That assumption is incorrect."
[d.
[d. at 370, 597 A.2d at 445 (citing Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662,
680, 541 A.2d 1303, 1312 (1988»; Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 487,
109 A.2d 128, 131 (1954); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 429, 24 A.2d 917,
920 (1942); Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 654, 73 A. 261, 263 (1909).
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 370, 597 A.2d at 445.
.
[d. at 374, 597 A.2d at 446.
312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988).
[d. at 684-85, 541 A.2d at 1314.
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wrong house. 123 The Qfficer was not allowed to claim good faith or
qualified immunity for a constitutional violation.J24 The Ritchie court
cited, with approval, a statement in Clea that "an official who
violates an individual's rights under the Maryland Constitution is not
entitled to any immunity."125 This holding is in direct contrast to
federal law, which does provide such immunities l26 and, depending
on the extent of this difference, could provide a cause of action for
damages under the state constitution in many cases when one does
not exist under federal law.127
IV.

EVALUATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL APPROACHES

Plaintiffs have never been able to sue the state or state officials
for damages when their federal constitutional rights have been violated pursuant to state laws or policies. 128 This result has been strongly
criticized for leaving injured innocent citizens without a remedy
against harm by the state. 129 Leaving such victims uncompensated
seems particularly unfair when compared to plaintiffs who have been
injured by violations caused by local or municipal actions and can
recover. This difference in result cannot be justified on public policy
grounds. There is no rationale for protecting state treasuries while
not affording the same protection to municipalities.
A.

Federal

The difference between the federal treatment of states versus
municipalities is primarily historical, dating back to an early broad
reading of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.130 Although the Eleventh Amendment by its terms prohibits

123. Id. at 665, 541 A.2d at 1304.
124. ld. at 684-85, 541 A.2d at 1314.
125. Ritchie, 324 Md. at 373, 597 A.2d at 446 (citing Clea, 312 Md. at 684, 541
A.2d at 1314).
126. See supra notes 23-26, 75-85 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 155-85 and accompanying text.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 131-42.
129. See PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS (1983) (advocating Congressional abrogation of states' Eleventh
Amendment protection for constitutional violations); Akil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Frederic LeClerq, State
Immunity and Federal Judicial Power-Retreat From National Supremacy, 27
FLA. L. REV. 361 (1975).
130. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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only suits against a state by citizens of another state, the Supreme
Court held in Hans v. Louisiana 131 that all suits against a state are
barred, even when brought by their own citizens. 132
However, the Court has not allowed plaintiffs to avoid this bar
merely by naming the state official responsible for implementing state
policy.133 The Court recognized that to do so would have virtually
the same effect as removing the protection of the Amendment, since
payment would ultimately come from the state treasury.134 The Court
has allowed suits against state officials for injunctions prohibiting
the officials from implementing unconstitutional state policies,135 and
suits against state officials in their individual capacity, where they
were alleged to have acted beyond or in violation of state policies.136
But neither of these exceptions violate the fundamental premise of
the Eleventh Amendment, to restore state sovereignty and to protect
state treasuries from attack, absent the state's consent. 131 The allowance of injunctive relief against state officials was a compromise
necessary to ensure that states could be forced to comply with the
Constitution, while not holding them liable for any past harm .138
Likewise, the allowance of suits against state officials in their
individual capacity would also not affect the state treasuries, since
such damage awards would be paid by the officials personally, and

131.
132.
133.
134.

135.
136.
137.

138.

134 u.s. 1 (1890).
Id. at 20-21.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
Id. "[W)hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke
its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,
464 (1945).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
This is the "immunity" interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court in Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and accepted by a majority of the Court since
then. PETER Low & CALVIN JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL STATE RELATIONS (2d ed. 1989). The conflicting "diversity" interpretation, more faithful to the constitutional language, would bar only diversity
suits based on state law causes of action. This view was espoused by Justice
Brennan in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 289-90 (1985);
see also, Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977).
Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the
federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to
"the supreme authority of the United States." Penn hurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984). As Justice Brennan observed, "Ex
parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the
principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights
and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 106 (1971).
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not the state.l 39 Such personal liability is not unfair, since officials
are personally liable only for exceeding their authority and are
otherwise protected by qualified immunity unless their actions violate
a settled constitutional right of which they should have been aware. l40
It is true that many government entities indemnify or insure their
officials against many such personal judgments,141 but the decision
to do so, since voluntary, is not an intrusion into state sovereignty.
States have always been able voluntarily to waive their protection
under the Eleventh Amendment. 142
The Supreme Court revisited the question of whether states may
be held liable for constitutional violations in 1976. 143 The Court,
interpreting an extension of Title VIII44 to state employers, held that
Congress, when acting pursuant to its powers under section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, could abrogate a state's protection under
the Eleventh Amendment. 145 This logically led to the question of
whether Congress, by enacting Section 1983, had chosen to abrogate
the states' immunity from suit. The Court, in Quem v. Jordan, 146
held that Congress had not clearly indicated on the face of the statute
an intention to "sweep away" the states' immunity and that it
therefore remained intact. 147
The most recent case involving state liability under Section 1983
is Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. 148 In this case, suit
was brought under Section 1983 against the state police in state court,
rather than federal court, so that the Eleventh Amendment was not
an obstacle to liability.149 The Will Court held that Congress had not
139.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

148.
149.

[I)t is clear that a suit against a government official in his or her
personal capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon the
government entity. A victory in a personal-capacity action is a victory
against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity that
employs him. Indeed, unless a distinct cause of action is asserted
against the entity itself, the entity is not even a party to a personalcapacity lawsuit and has no opportunity to present a defense.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1985).
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
PETER Low & CALVIN JEFFRIES, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 49 (1988); Suing the
Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979).
See supra note 57.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq. (1988).
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (1976).
440 U.S. 332 (1979).
Section 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an
intent to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor does it have a history
which focuses directly on the question of state liability or shows that Congress
considered and firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity
of the States. [d. at 332.
491 U.S. 58 (1989).
[d. at 63-64.
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intended states to be "persons" under Section 1983. 150 This result
seemingly contradicts with the Monell holding that municipalities
were to be considered persons under Section 1983. 151
The result, in Will, was reached through historical evaluation,
looking at the intent of the Congress that had passed Section 1983,
and not to whether states, as a matter of policy, should be held
responsible for constitutional violations. 152 Therefore, plaintiffs in
federal court cannot avoid the official capacity defense by suing the
state officer responsible for enforcing the unconstitutional rules in
his official capacity. State officials, sued in their official capacity,
are not considered persons subject to a Section 1983 suit for damages.153 However, state officers are considered persons for purposes
of a suit for injunctive relief. 154 Although this may make no logical
sense, it preserves what has been the status quo for many years.

150. [d. at 65. This result, although not dictated by the Eleventh Amendment, was

certainly influenced by it:
This does not mean, as petitioner suggests, that we think that the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of § 1983 are not
separate issues. Certainly they are. But in deciphering congressional
intent as to the scope of § 1983, the scope of the Eleventh Amendment
is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a reading of § 1983 that
disregards it.
[d. at 66-67. The Court held that Congress had intended § 1983 to be enforced
primarily in the federal courts, so that plaintiffs could avoid having to file suit
in state courts. [d. at 66. Congress, knowing that state liability was prohibited
in the federal courts, would not have "intended nevertheless to create a cause
of action against States to be brought in state courts, which are precisely the
courts Congress sought to allow civil rights claimants to avoid through § 1983."
[d.

151. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
"But it does not follow that if municipalities are persons then so are States.
States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not,
and we consequently limited our holding in Monell 'to local government units
which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. '"
Will, 491 U.S. at 70.
152. Will. 491 U.S. at 65-69.
153. Obviously. state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official
in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a
suit against the [state] official's office .... We see no reason to adopt a
different rule in the present context. particularly when such a rule would allow
petitioner to circumvent congressional intent by a mere pleading device.
We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are "persons" under § 1983.
[d. at 71.
154. The Court held that a state official in his or her official capacity. when sued
for injunctive relief. would be a person under § 1983 because "official-capacity
actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State."
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); Ex parle Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
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B.

State
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has reached a different
conclusion for claims brought under the Maryland Constitution by
refusing to recognize the distinction between official capacity and
individual capacity suits. ISS As under federal law, claims against the
state itself are barred, not by the Eleventh Amendment, but by the
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity.ls6 Only the legislature
can change this result, through legislation waiving the immunity.
Suits against individuals, however, are another matter. The court
of appeals made clear that the state's sovereign immunity does not
extend to any state officials who have injured one of the state's
citizens through a constitutional violation. 1S7 "To do so would 'create
a· privileged class, free from liability for wrongs inflicted or injuries
threatened. "'158 This reasoning makes sense when applied to suits for
individual actions in excess of an official's authority, for in that case
it is his or her own wrongdoing which has caused the harm. It does
not make sense, however, to hold a state official personally liable
for merely carrying out or enforcing state law, when it is the law
itself that causes the violation.
Holding the state official personally accountable for enforcing
an unconstitutional state law could result in grave injustice in many
cases. For example, it is hard to imagine that the Secretary of the
Department of Human Resources would be personally responsible
for millions of dollars in damages by implementing an unconstitutional state welfare statute. Yet there is no other way to read the
Ritchie opinion. The court of appeals cites with approval the case
of Wyler v. Gibson,.s9 "where the Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary was held personally liable for an encroachment on the plaintiffs'
land caused by an expansion of the Penitentiary. The expansion of
the Penitentiary was authorized by a statute which specified the areas
of its expansion and authorized condemnation." 160
What is a state official supposed to do when confronted with a
duty under state law to implement a possibly unconstitutional state
statute? Technically, since federal law is supreme, the official should
refuse to carry out the unconstitutional statute. Is it fair, however,
to confront a state official with the choice of either ignoring state
law and possibly losing his or her job, or, on the other hand,
155. Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 373-74, 597 A.2d 432, 446 (1991); see supra
notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
156. Ritchie, 324 Md. at 369, 597 A.2d at 444.
157. Id. at 369-70, 597 A.2d at 444.
158. Id. at 369, 597 A.2d at 444 (quoting Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 285, 159
A. 751, 755 (1932».
159. 110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261 (1909).
160. Ritchie, 324 Md. at 371, 597 A.2d at 445.
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implementing a potentially unconstitutional statute and becoming
personally liable in damages if it does turn out that the statute is
unconstitutional?
This choice is particularly disturbing when coupled with the
second part of the Ritchie holding, that state officials are not entitled
to qualified immunity from damages. 161 Under federal law , an official
cannot be held liable unless the constitutional right in question had
been established at the time that the official took action. 162 Applying
the Ritchie holding, an official could be held liable for implementing
a state statute later held unconstitutional, even if the official had no
reason to know of its unconstitutionality at the time that he or she
took action.
If public officials are held liable in such situations, many people
may be unwilling to serve in public positions. In fact, although the
judgment would be entered against the individual official, it is
inconceivable that the state would not indemnify an official who was
held liable merely for carrying out an unconstitutional state statute.
It would be extremely unfair for the state not to indemnify the
official in such circumstances.
If it is the state, as it must be, and not the individual who will
eventually pay in such circumstances, then the Ritchie opinion is
nothing more than a sleight of hand. The court of appeals has, in
effect, abolished state sovereign immunity from damages while avowing that only the legislature has the power to do SO.163
Actually, the reasoning of the Ritchie opinion is virtually identical with the reasoning of the federal case of Ex parte Young, 164
where the Supreme Court held that a suit against a state official is
not in actuality a suit against the state. 165 The difference, albeit a
large one in practical terms, is that the United States Supreme Court
has limited this holding to suits for injunctive relief. 166 The Ritchie
opinion also extends it to cases for damages. 167
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-81.
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 374 n.14, 597 A.2d at 446-47 n.14.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
In Ex parte Young the Supreme Court held that when a state official acts to
enforce an unconstitutional statute, "[ilt is simply an illegal act upon the part
of a state official" who is "stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct."
[d. at 159-60.
Compare this language to the language in the Ritchie opinion, which holds
that "[wlhen the State's agents act wrongly, their acts are ultra vires, and it
is '[tlhe mere wrong and trespass 0 f those individual persons .... '" Ritchie,
324 Md. at 369, 597 A.2d at 444 (quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S.
270 (1885).
166. Ex parle Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
167. Ritchie, 324 Md. at 374, 597 A.2d at 446.
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It must be noted, however, that this part of the Ritchie opinion
could be considered dicta. 168 The actual facts in Ritchie, of course,
do not involve what would be in federal parlance an official capacity
suit, but rather an individual capacity suit. 169 There was no state
statute that forced the sheriff to fire the plaintiff. The allegations
were that the sheriff treated Ritchie differently because of her sex.170
If these allegations were proven, it might not be unfair to subject
the sheriff to personal liability.
It must also be noted that the Wyler case,171 relied on by the
Ritchie court for establishing the proposition that a state official
would be personally liable for carrying out an unconstitutional state
statute,172 did not actually involve the award of compensatory damages against the official in such a case. Although the Ritchie court
reported that the warden in Wyler was held personally liable,173 the
suit in Wyler was for ejectment, not for damages. 174 The plaintiff in
Wyler received a judgment for the return of the property and only
nominal damages. 175 There was no monetary judgement against the
warden.
In fact, none of the cases cited by the court in Ritchie for the
proposition that a public official who violates the plaintiff's constitutional rights is liable in damages l76 involved a situation where a
public official was held liable for damages by carrying out official
policy. In Clea v. City of Baltimore, 177 police officers carried out an
unconstitutional search. 178 The search was done by mistake and not
pursuant to official policy, 179 so it would have been an individual,
not an official policy, suit. This was also the case in Heinze v.
Murphy,180 which involved an illegal arrest without probable cause.
Of all the cases, other than Wyler, cited by the Ritchie court,
only Mason v. Wrightson l81 involved a public official who was
carrying out official policy. In Mason, a police sergeant was held
liable for an illegal search of a bar patron conducted pursuant to an
order from the commissioner of police to search all suspicious

168. See supra note 167.
169. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
170. Ritchie, 324 Md. at 349, 597 A.2d at 434.

171. Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261 (1909).
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 371, 597 A.2d at 445.
[d.
Wey/er, 110 Md. at 650, 73 A. at 262.
[d. at 651, 73 A. at 262.
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 371-73, 597 A.2d at 445-46.
177. 312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988).
178. [d. at 665, 541 A.2d at 1304.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

179. [d.

180. 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942).
181. 205 Md. 481, 109 A.2d 128 (1954).
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persons. 182 Because the patron was not harmed in the search, damages
were only awarded in the sum of one cent. 183
This is not to say that the court might not approve a large
damages award against a state official for carrying out an unconstitutional state law, only that they have not yet actually done so.
Clearly, by refusing to distinguish between individual and official
capacity suits, the Ritchie court has set the stage for such awards.
The court has decided, as a policy matter, that all persons harmed
by unconstitutional state action should be entitled to compensation.
This result is more equitable than the federal result of denying relief
in such situations.
Unfairness would only result if the damage award in such cases
were paid by the official personally. As discussed above, this will
not' likely be the case, because of voluntary indemnification by the
state. There is another reason why the official, at least in many
cases, might not be personally liable for the judgement. As noted in
a footnote in the Ritchie opinion, the state legislature, as part of the
Maryland Tort Claims Act,184 has waived the state's immunity from.
certain tort actions and allowed the state to be substituted for the
state official, who is granted immunity,l85 Thus, any discussion of
this issue must include an examination of the Torts Claim Act and
its effect on the holding in Ritchie.
V.

THE MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT

A.

Application to State Ojjicials

The court in Ritchie mentions the Maryland Tort Claims Act
(hereinafter the State Act) only in a footnote at the end of the
opinion while reviewing its holding as to governmental and personal
liability.186 The court first asserts that its conclusion-that the state
is immune from unconstitutional acts and that the individual employee would be liable-could be changed by statute. 187 The court
stated that
[t]he General Assembly . . . could provide that the State
will be liable for damages resulting from state constitutional
torts such as those alleged by the plaintiff in this case, and
that the individual employee will be immune. In other words,

182. [d. at 484-87, 109 A.2d at 129-3J.
183. [d. at 488-89, 109 A.2d at 131-32.
184. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 12-101 to 12-204 (1993).

185. Ritchie v. DonnelIy, 324 Md. 344, 375 n.14, 597 A.2d 432, 447 n.14 (1991).
186. [d.
187. [d. at 369, 597 A.2d at 444.
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the Legislature may substitute state liability for individual
employee liability. 188
The court then recognized that the Maryland legislature had
done "precisely this, under certain circumstances, in the Maryland
Tort Claims Act. "189 The State Act waives the sovereign immunity
defense of the state and grants immunity to the individual official
for "tort actions generally," 190 as long as the employee's actions were
not malicious, grossly negligent, or outside the scope of employment. 191 The State Act, as amended in 1985, would encompass many
constitutional claims. A 1989 bill that would have exempted state
constitutional claims from the State Act did not pass. 192 The court
remarked that the State Act did not apply to give immunity to the·
individual defendant in Ritchie, because there had been allegations
of malice. 193 The court did indicate, however, that if the plaintiff
failed to prove malice at trial, the defendant might plead the statutory
immunity at that time. 194
If the court's implication about the State Act is true, some of
the unfairness of the results which would follow from application of
the law as stated in the body of the opinion is corrected. State
employees who were merely enforcing state law in good faith would
not, in fact, be held personally liable for tortious injury caused by
constitutional violations. But at the same time, injured plaintiffs in
such cases would be allowed to recover from the state directly. State
employees who acted maliciously would still be personally liable.
One must wonder why the court bothered to spend several pages
of text laying out what the law would be in the absence of a statute,
when a completely different result would be reached under the statute,
which does, in fact, seem to apply in many cases. This is especially
problematic since a plaintiff who followed the court's reasoning in
Ritchie, and sued the individual rather than the state, might be left
without any remedy if the official successfully claimed immunity
under the statute. In such a case, it does not appear that the state
could merely be substituted as a defendant after suit had been filed,

188. [d. at 374-75 n.14, 597 A.2d at 446-47 n.14.
189. [d.
190. [d. (quoting Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 219, 592 A.2d 1090, 1092

(1991». Prior to a 1985 Amendment, the State Act encompassed only a limited
listed number of torts. The 1985 amendments made the State Act applicable
to any torts, excluding only claims arising from the combatant activities of the
State Militia during a state of emergency. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 5-399.2(a) (1994).
191. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-399.2 (1994).
192. See H. 364, 1989 Sess. (Md. 1989).
193. Ritchie, 324 Md. at 375, 597 A.2d at 447.
194. [d.
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because the State Act requires that a notice of claim must be presented
to the state treasurer within 180 days of the occurrence. 195
Plaintiffs would be able to recover under the reasoning of the
court's opinion l96 or under the State Act,197 but only if they followed
the appropriate procedures for the appropriate type of case. In cases
where the unconstitutional action was made by the official in good
faith, within the scope of his or her duty, the proper defendant
would be the state, and the notice provisions of the State Act would
have to be followed. 198 In cases where the official acted in bad faith,
or was grossly negligent, or acted outside the scope of employment,
suit would be proper only against the individual. 199 In fact, in many
cases, the only safe course for a plaintiff to follow would be to sue
both the state and the individual, because it may be impossible to
determine at the onset of the suit whether any of the exceptions to
the State Act applied. For example, in Ritchie the plaintiff had
alleged malice on the part of the individual defendant. 2°O As the court
implied, however, if malice was not proved at trial, the defendant
would be immune under the statute. 201 Unless the state had been
included as a proper defendant at that time, it would be too late to
add it.
One question not addressed by the court is what would happen
if the amount of damages exceeded the waiver of immunity under
the statute. Would the individual defendant be responsible for damages under the reasoning of Ritchie or would the defendant be
completely protected by the immunity granted under the State Act?
Although the State Act does not contain a dollar limitation on
the amount of damages, waiver of immunity is limited "to the extent

195. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-106 (1993)_ The 180 day notice requirement
is significantly shorter than the normal limitations period for torts-three years
for most negligent and some intentional torts, see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1994), and one year for assault, battery, libel, and slander,
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-105 (1994). Therefore, it is quite
likely that if a plaintiff filed suit against the state employee who claimed
immunity and had the suit dismissed, by the time the case was dismissed, the
180 day notice period would have expired. On the other hand, the state attorney
general may, as a regular practice, allow the state to be substituted as a party
when the plaintiff has incorrectly sued the state official personally. Interview
with Carmen Shepard, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland (1994).
196. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1994) (using the three year
statute of limitations for individual tort actions).
197. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12-106 (1994) (using the 180 day procedural
requirement of the State Act).
198. [d.
199. See supra note 187.

200. Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 350 n.I, 597 A.2d 432, 435 n.1 (1991).
201. [d. at 375, 597 A.2d at 447.
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of insurance coverage" held by the state. 202 The amount of this
waiver has been set by the state treasurer at $50,000 per claimant
for each injury.203 At the same time, the immunity granted to the
official by the State Act does not seem to have a similar monetary
limit. Therefore, at least under the scheme of the State Act, it does
appear that an injured plaintiff might go uncompensated for part of
a large claim.
Given the Ritchie opinion, however, it is unclear whether such
a result would be allowed by the court. This is because the court
clarifies in Ritchie that absent a statutory provision, the official
would be personally liable. 204 The purpose of this result is to avoid
creating "'a privileged class, free from liability for wrongs inflicted
or injuries threatened." '205 The Ritchie court indicates that it is up
to the legislature to decide whether to waive the state's sovereign
immunity.206 The court also indicates that the individual liability
recognized in Ritchie could be abolished by statute if the legislature
substituted state for individual liability. 207 There is no discussion,
however, of whether the legislature could grant the individual official
immunity without the accompanying waiver of immunity so that an
injured plaintiff could be compensated. It is unclear whether the
Court of Appeals of Maryland would allow this result. On the one
hand, to do so would create the same problem of leaving a plaintiff,
who had been injured by the unconstitutional acts of a state official,
uncompensated. On the other hand, there is no mention in the
Ritchie opinion that the court's goal of compensating all such injured
plaintiffs is itself constitutionally required. If it is not constitutionally
required, then it might be subject to legislative control.
Furthermore, if the state could not grant individual immunity
without substituting state liability, then it might not be able to have
the individual's immunity exceed the state's waiver of immunity
because of the same lack of compensation for constitutional injuries
exceeding the waiver amount. 208

202. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12-104(a) (1993).
203. COMAR § 25.02.02.02 D (I). Judgments for more than this amount may be
paid, but only with approval of "the Board of Public Works, with the advice
and counsel of the Attorney General." MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12104(c) (1993).
204. Ritchie, 324 Md. at 373-74, 597 A.2d at 446.
205. [d. at 369, 597 A.2d at 444 (quoting Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 285, 159
A. 751, 755, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 564 (1932».
206. [d. at 369, 597 A.2d at 444. "The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes
such a damages action against the 'State of Maryland' absent legislation
consenting to suit." [d. (emphasis added).
207. [d. at 374 n.14, 597 A.2d at 446-47 n.14.
208. An argument could be made that even if the legislature could not abolish the
common-law right of action against the public official without substituting
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If the limitation on state liability coupled with complete immunity for the state official is allowed to stand, how will this affect
the Ritchie doctrine, especially those areas where under Ritchie,
liability for violations of the state constitution exceeded that for
violations of the federal constitution? The first question that needs
to be answered is which claims for damages for violations of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights would be considered tort actions,
subject to the limitations of the Maryland Tort Claims Act.2 09
Some claims, such as claims for excessive force or for illegal
. search and seizure, would clearly be viewed as torts. Other claims,
such as the failure to pay some public benefits due to an unconstitutional regulation, are not normally thought of as torts. A 'broad
definition of torts, however, would encompass all violations of
constitutional rights that resulted in harm to the plaintiffs.
Black's Law Dictionary defines a tort as a violation of a duty
owing to the plaintiff, as long as that duty is imposed by law rather
than by agreement of the parties, or a contract. 2lO Because all suits
brought for violation of constitutional rights involve a violation of
a duty imposed by law, they would fall within the definition of a
tort. The court in Ritchie seems to assume that the claims in that
case, employment sex discrimination, would fall within the definition
of the State Act. 211
If the limitations of the State Act stand, the greatest impact will
be on official capacity suits against state officials, where the harm
is directly caused by implementation of an unconstitutional state
policy. Under federal law, such claims are not allowed. 212 Under
Ritchie, they are allowed without limitation. 213 If the present limitation of the State Act stands, such suits would be limited to $50,000. 214
This is still a better result than under federal law, but would present
a barrier to very large claims. 215
The limitations of the State Act will have no effect on the most
egregious violations by state officials, those involving claims where
the official has acted with actual malice. In such cases, no immunity

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

some state liability, it could substitute something less than full liability for all
damages, The court of appeals has approved a damage cap of $350,000 for
non-economic losses in medical malpractice cases, Murphy v, Edmonds, 325
Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
See Ritchie, 324 Md. 344, 597 A.2d 432.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990).
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 375, 597 A.2d at 447.
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
Ritchie, 344 Md. at 375, 597 A.2d at 447.
See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
Obviously, the extent of the impact of this restriction could only be known if
the percentage of judgments for "official capacity" suits that exceed $50,000
were known. Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article.
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is granted under the statute and full damages may be awarded against
the officials themselves.216 That the State Act does not apply is a
mixed blessing. Although the dollar limitation does not limit a
plaintiff's recovery, the deep pocket of the state is not substituted
to make a plaintiff's actual recovery more likely.217 Although government officials are often insured or indemnified for constitutional
violations, such protection often does not cover claims involving
malice or punitive damages.218
Although recovery under Section 1983 may also be allowed in
some cases, recovery under state law may be important, because it
may not always be allowed under federal law, due to the official's
qualified immunity. Qualified immunity under federal law is no
longer determined by whether the official acted in good faith or bad
faith-malice. Even if the official acted maliciously, he or she is
protected by the immunity unless the constitutional right in question
was "clearly established" at the time of the actions.219 Therefore, in
a situation where a plaintiff is injured by the malicious actions of a
government official whose conduct is a violation of a constitutional
right that was not clearly established until after those actions, the
plaintiff could recover under state, but not federal law.
The Ritchie doctrine, even if subject to the limits of the State
Act, will also prove helpful to some plaintiffs injured by the nonmalicious, individual actions of state officials. This results from the
fact that state law does not recognize the qualified immunity granted
to public officials in individual capacity actions under Section 1983.220
The impact of state law in such situations might arguably be greater
than in those involving malicious action as discussed above. This is
because even though federal immunity is not based on whether the
defendant acted maliciously or not, it is more likely that a defendant
who acted maliciously would have violated a settled constitutional
right than one who acted in good faith.221 Therefore, the good faith
216. The State Act requires that the employee act "in good faith" and "not in a
reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent manner" to receive the immunity. MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-399.1(c) (1994).
217. Under the State Act, the waiver of governmental immunity is supposed to
coincide exactly with the granting of individual immunity. Therefore, when
Ritchie is read in concert with the State Act, it is clear that liability for
constitutional violations will always lie either with the government or with the
individual, depending on the circumstances, but not with both.
218. See PETER Low & JOHN JEFFRIES, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND
RELATED STATUTES 49 (1988).
219. See supra note 88.
220. See discussion supra part 1I1.C.
221. This is because an official acting with malice would be more likely to disregard
plaintiffs' constitutional rights, even if they were so well settled that the official
would have known of them. An official acting in good faith would not, at
least purposely, violate plaintiffs' rights.
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defendant is more likely to retain his or her federal qualified immunity, and suit under state law, even if limited by the State Act,
might be the only recovery allowed.

B.

Application to Local Government Officials

The court in Ritchie assumed for the purpose of deciding the
case, that the defendant county sheriff was a state employee rather
than a local government employee. 222 While recognizing the distinction
under federal law between state and local officials,223 the court did
not make such a distinction in the section of the opinion dealing
with suits under the Maryland Constitution. 224
The court referred to the liability of public officials 225 and
government officials,226 not to state or local officials. There is nothing, in either the language or the reasoning of the opinion, that
would limit its reach to state officials and not include local officials.
Therefore, the holding that state officials would be liable in damages
for violations of the state constitution227 would seem to apply to
local government officials as well.
However, the footnote recognizing the power of the legislature
to substitute government for individual liability, through a tort claims
act, would also seem applicable. 228 There is a Local Government Tort
Claims Act 229 (hereinafter the Local Act) which is similar, but not
identical, to the State Act. 230 As mentioned previously, the result of
the State Act is to hold the individual liable for acts that were
malicious or outside of the scope of employment, and to hold the
state liable, up to a limit of $50,000, for non-malicious actions taken
within the scope of employment. 231
Because of differences in language and structure, the Local Act
may not reach the same result. The Local Act holds local governments
liable, up to a limit of $200,000 per individual claim and $500,000
per occurrence, "for any judgment against its employee for damages
resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee
within the scope of employment with the local government. "232 This
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 357-58, 597 A.2d 432, 438 (1991):
[d. at 356-57, 597 A.2d at 438.
See id. at 368-75, 597 A.2d at 443-47.
[d. at 370, 597 A.2d at 445.
[d.
[d. at 373-74, 597 A.2d at 446-47.
[d. at 374-75 n.14, 597 A.2d at 446-47 n.14.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 5-401 to 5-404 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 12-101 to 12-204 (1993).
See supra text accompanying notes 186-206 for a discussion of the results under
the Maryland Tort Claims Act.
232. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 5-403(a)-(b) (1994).
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liability is derivative, and the government may assert any immunity
or defense possessed by the employee on June 30, 1987, the effective
date of the Local Act. 233 The local government may "only be held'
liable to the extent that a judgment could have been rendered against
such an employee. "234
Another section of the Local Act provides that "a person may
1,10t execute [a judgment] against an employee" for acts within the
scope of employment unless the employee acted with actual malice.235
It is important to note that the prohibition is against "executing"
rather than obtaining the judgment.
The most reasonable interpretation of these sections when read
together is that local government officials could be sued for all
constitutional violations. If the official did not act with malice, the
judgment could not be enforced against him or her personally, and
only the government would be liable, up to the damage limitation.
If the official acted with malice, the judgment could be enforced
against the government, with a right of indemnification against the
official,236 or against the official personally. 237 This reading would
make the results very similar to the results in a suit under the State
Act, with the following differences: Under the State Act, if the
official acted maliciously, only the official would be liable.238 Under
the Local Act, if the official acted maliciously, both the official and
the government would be liable, but the government could sue the
official for indemnification. 239 Under both acts, if the official did
not act maliciously, only the government would be liable. 240 The
difference in non-malicious actions would only be the amount of
liability, which is considerably higher under the Local Act. 241
This result is complicated, however, by another statute that was
passed in 1990. 242 Part of the statute, which deals with numerous

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

MD. CODE ANN., CTS.

& JUD. PROC. § 5-403(e) (1994).

[d.
& JUD. PROC. § 5-402(b) (1994).
& JUD. PROC. § 5-402(b)(2)(ii) (1994).
There is, of course, an alternative reading. If the section prohibiting a person
from executing a judgment against an official who acted without malice were
read as an immunity from judgment, then in such cases the governmental entity
would also be immune, since its liability is derivative and dependant on a
judgment against the individual. It does appear, however, that the language of
"execute" rather than "enter" a judgment was deliberate, in order to avoid
just this resu It.
See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-402(b)(2)(ii) (1994).
See supra notes 216-17, 235-37 and accompanying text.
Compare supra note 232 and accompanying text with notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-321 (1994).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
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issues of governmental immunities, provides that "[a]n official of a
municipal corporation, while acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the official's employment or
authority shall be immune as an official or individual from any civil
liability for the performance of the action. "243
Unlike the provision of the Local Act, which is merely a prohibition against executing a judgment against the official personally,244
this provision holds the official "immune"-presumably meaning
that no judgment could be entered against the official.245 This in turn
would also destroy the government's derivative liability, since it is
only liable "to the extent that a judgment could have been rendered"
against the employee. 246
This was the position of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland in the case of Davis v. Dipino.247 The court dismissed state
constitutional claims against both an officer of the Ocean City Police
Department and against the City, because there was no showing that
the officer had acted maliciously and therefore suit was barred by
the immunity provided by section 5-321 of the Maryland Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Code. 248
It is not entirely clear, however, whether the passage of the 1990
immunity statute was meant to have the effect of removing not only
individual, but also governmental immunity under the Local Act.
Given this interpretation, this section greatly reduces the coverage of
the Local Act. There would be no liability, either personal or
governmental, for any constitutional violations committed while an
official was acting in good faith. This, of course, runs counter to
the reasoning of Ritchie.
The only governmental liability allowed under the Local Act
would occur if the official acted with malice, when he or she would
have been liable anyway. The only positive effect of the Local Act
for victims, therefore, would be to provide an alternative deep pocket
defendant for constitutional violations that had been committed with
malice.
A more sensible reading of the 1990 immunity clause would be
that it was enacted to make certain that public officials could not
be held personally liable for non-malicious actions. If the legislature
had intended to remove governmental liability as well as personal

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-321(b)(I) (1994).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-402(b) (1994).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-321 (1994).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-403 (1994).
99 Md. App. 282, 637 A.2d 475 (1994).
248. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-321 (1994).

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
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liability, it is likely that they would have made this clear, rather than
relying on the fact that immunizing the official would also immunize
the government.
If the restrictive reading of the Davis court prevails, it will make
recovery for violations of the state constitution committed by local
officials more difficult. It must be remembered, however, that unlike
the situation with state officials, recompense may already be had
under Section 1983 for violations of federal law committed by local
officials acting in their official capacity. If the local official was
acting pursuant to official government policy, suit may be brought
against the government itself. 249 Additionally, if the local official was
acting in an individual capacity, suit could be maintained under
Section 1983 if the right in question had previously been clearly
established. 250 Also, if the official had acted with malice, suit could
be maintained under the Local Act. 251
The only gap in liability would occur where the official had
acted in an individual capacity, not pursuant to government policy,
but without malice, and had violated a right which had not been
clearly established at the time of the harm. In this case, under the
reasoning of the court of special appeals, neither the official nor the
government would be liable. It might be unfair to hold the official
liable in such circumstances, but it might be appropriate to provide
for government liability. This is the result under the State Act, and
was the result under the Local Act, absent the 1990 immunity statute.
VI.

FILING IN STATE VERSUS FEDERAL COURT

A plaintiff who wishes to assert both federal and state constitutional claims faces the choice of whether to file suit in state or
federal court. State claims may be asserted in federal court through
the doctrine of pendent, or supplemental jurisdiction. 252 This doctrine
allows plaintiffs to bring state claims into federal court as long as
they are so related to the federal claims "that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution. "253 By the same token, a plaintiff may bring Section
249.
250.
251.
252.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
Pendant jurisdiction, a doctrine developed by the federal courts, allowed a
plaintiff who was asserting a federal claim in federal court, to assert a state
claim against the same defendant, if it arose out of a "common nucleus of
operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
Pendant jurisdiction has recently been codified and merged with its cousin,
ancillary jurisdiction, under the new term, supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U .S.c.
§ 1367 (1994).
253. 28 U.S.c. § 1367(a) (1994).
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1983 claims in state, as well as federal court. 254 In fact, state courts

may not refuse to hear, or otherwise discriminate, against Section
1983 claims.25S
There are many factors that might lead litigants to prefer having
their case heard in state versus federal court. 256 A general discussion
of the relative merits of the two court systems is beyond the scope
of this Article. What needs to be discussed here, however, are the
options that are open to the litigants, especially in those situations
where liability under state law may exceed that under federal law.
Where liability under both state and federal law is identical, the
situation is relatively straightforward. For example, consider the
situation of a state police officer who, savagely and without cause,
beats a suspect taken into custody. In this situation, the officer has
clearly violated the settled constitutional rights of the plaintiff under
both the federal and state constitutions. Also, under both Section
1983 holdings and the Ritchie opinion, the officer would be liable
for the damages personally. 257
In such a case, the plaintiff could file both claims in federal
court. 258 The plaintiff could also file both claims in state court, but
in that case the defendant could have the case removed to federal
court if he or she desired. 259 If the plaintiff preferred to have the
case heard in state court, he or she would have to forgo the federal
claims and pursue only the state claims. That would also mean
forgoing the possibility of receiving an award of attorney's fees,
which may accompany a successful Section 1983 claim.260
254. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,3 n.1 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980).

255. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (holding that state courts cannot
256.

257.
258.

259.
260.

refuse to hear § 1983 claims brought in a court otherwise competent to hear
that type of claim).
For a thorough analysis of the rationale for and against bringing a § 1983
claim in state versus federal court, see STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, STATE COURT §
1983 LITIGATION: AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE FOR STATE COURT JUDGES (1992);
STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS (1989); see
also Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section /983 and the State Courts, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1057 (1989).
See Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 373-74, 597 A.2d 432, 446-47 (1991);
supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
Jurisdiction over the federal claim would be based on 28 U.S.c. § 1331 or §
1343 {I 994). Jurisdiction over the state law claim would be based on 28 U.S.c.
§ 1367 (1994).
28 U.S.c. § 1441 (1994), allows a defendant to remove to federal court any
civil action over which the district courts have original jurisdiction.
The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, codified as part of 42
U.S.c. § 1988 (1994), allows prevailing plaintiffs in a § 1983 action to recover
reasonable attorneys' fees. Such fees may be awarded whether the § 1983 claim
is brought in state or federal court, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I, 8 (1980),
but are not available in state court for common-law claims brought under the
Maryland Constitution.
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The results are also quite straightforward when a plaintiff wishes
to assert a claim allowable under Ritchie that would not be allowable
under Section 1983-for example, a complaint against a state official
acting in his or her official capacity. Such a case could be brought
only in state court. .
The choice becomes somewhat more problematic in a situation
where the plaintiff's federal law claim might be barred by the
defendant's qualified immunity. It is not always clear at the outset
of the litigation whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights had been
"clearly established" enough to avoid the immunity. In this type of
case, the defendant will likely move for summary judgment on the
federal claims relying on immunity grounds. Federal courts have been
instructed to deal with this defense by motion for summary judgment
before triaP61 If summary judgment is granted as to the federal
claims, the court has discretion to dismiss the supplementary state
claims, and will in most instances do SO.262 The plaintiff would then
have to refile the state claims in state court. Although this is a
procedural inconvenience, it will not be fatal to the plaintiff's claims
since the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute has a provision
that tolls the statute of limitations for pendant state claims dismissed
by the federal court. 263
if the plaintiff wished to avoid the possibility of the inconvenience of refiling in state court, he or she could file both federal and
state claims in state court. This may not work, however, since the
defendant could first remove the entire case to federal court, then
move for summary judgment on the federal claim, then have the
state claim dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This
would force the plaintiff to refile the state claims back in state court
where he or she had started some months before.
The bottom line is that the Ritchie holding, insofar as it extends
liability beyond that provided by federal law, will be applied, in the
main, by state, not federal courts.
VII.

EFFECT ON ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
One question left unanswered by the Ritchie opinion is whether
state officials exercising legislative, judicial, or prosecutorial functions
261. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
262. The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that the court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction if "the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U .S.c. § 1367(c)(3) (1994). The
earlier such a dismissal occurs in the lawsuit, the more likely the court will
dismiss the state law claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966). For an example of a case where a federal court dismissed Maryland
constitutional law claims after finding that the parallel federal claims had been
barred by qualified immunity, see Jackson v. Bostick, 760 F. Supp. 524, 532
n.6 (D. Md. 1991).
263. 28 U.S.c. § 1367(d) (1994).
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enjoy the same absolute immunity from damages for state constitutional claims as they do from federal claims. Ritchie involved a
sheriff exercising executive functions, who under federal law would
have received only qualified immunity. 264 The Ritchie opinion makes
clear that such a qualified immunity defense is not available under
state law against a state constitutional claim. 265 Both the reasoning
of the opinion and, at one point, even the language would seem to
apply to absolute immunities as well. 266 If that were the case, then
plaintiffs could sue judges and prosecutors for constitutional violations, which they have never been able to do under federal law. This
would have been a somewhat surprising result given the firm entrenchment of such immunities.
In its most recent opinion on the subject, however, the court of
appeals has made clear that absolute judicial immunity remains firm,
even against claims brought under the Maryland Constitution. 267
In Parker v. State,268 the plaintiff brought suit against a circuit
court judge who mistakenly issued an arrest warrant for her on
charges for which she had already been acquitted, without checking
the case file or docket entries .269 She brought a Section 1983 claim
against the judge and a claim against the state under the State Tort
Claims Act, alleging false imprisonment, false arrest, and negligence
on the part of the judge.27°
In discussing the state's liability for the Torts Act claim, the
court first noted that all parties agreed that since liability under the
Tort Claims Act was derivative, if Judge Brown was entitled to
absolute judicial immunity, then the state would not be liable under
the Act. 271 The court also noted that plairitiff had asserted only
nonconstitutional state law torts and had not specifically asserted

264. Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 360, 597 A.2d 432, 440 (1991).
265. [d. at 373-74, 597 A.2d at 446.

266. At one point in the opinion, the Ritchie court indicates that a public official
is not entitled to "the qualified immunity defense available in a § 1983 action."
Ritchie, 324 Md. at 374, 597 A.2d at 446 (emphasis added). At another point,
however, the court cites with approval language from Clea v. City of Baltimore
that "an official who violates an individual's rights under the Maryland
Constitution is not entitled to any immunity." [d. at 373, 597 A.2d at 446
(quoting Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. at 684, 541 A.2d at 1314 (emphasis
added». This "any immunity" language, cannot be taken as too strong an
indication that the court was abolishing absolute immunity, however, since
both Cleo and Ritchie involved situations where the official would have received
no more than qualified immunity.
267. Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 653 A.2d 436 (1995).
268. [d.
269. [d. at 437.
270. [d. at 437-38.
271. [d. at 438.
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violations of the Maryland Constitution. 272 The court made clear,
however, that "in light of the scope of judicial immunity under
Maryland law, the result would be no different if we construed
Parker's allegations as setting forth a cause of action for violation
of Article 24 or 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. "273
The court reviewed the doctrine of judicial immunity under
English common law, federal law, and Maryland law, and found
that it had been firmly established since 1607.274 It held that under
Maryland law, judges were absolutely immune from civil liability for
their judicial acts. 275 The court specifically distinguished qualified
public official immunity, which was not available against claims for
intentional torts or for violations of the Maryland Constitution, from
absolute judicial immunity, which applied broadly to all civil claims
for damages.276
The holding in Parker leaves plaintiffs who have been injured
by the unconstitutional actions of judges without a civil damage
remedy under either federal or state law. This result is not surprising,
and, in fact, a contrary result would have been quite revolutionary.
Although the court's opinion addresses only absolute judicial immunity and not absolute prosecutorial or legislative immunity, there

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 438 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 439 (citing Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 E.R. 1305 (1607».
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443. The court distinguished public official immunity and judicial
immunity on both an historical basis and a policy basis. As to history, the
court noted that
while "a public official who violates a plaintiff's rights under the
Maryland Constitution is entitled to no immunity," Clea v. City of
Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 680, 541 A.2d 1303, 1312 (1988); Weyler v.
Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261 (1909), judicial immunity at common
law encompasses claims based upon the deprivation of constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, ... 13 Wall. [335,] 356-57, 20
L.Ed. [646,] 652 [18721; Hamond v. Howell, ... 2 Mod. [218,] 22021,86 E.R. [1035,] 1037 [1677].
.
Id.
In distinguishing the qualified immunity of public officials from absolute
judicial immunity, the court stated:
Unlike other public officials, judges are required, on a daily basis, to
make numerous decisions in disputes between adverse parties. With
respect to each judicial decision, there is a winner and a loser.
Furthermore, what is won or lost often has great value to the litigants:
the custody of children, compensation for serious injuries, freedom
from physical restraint, or simply large sums of money. With such
important issues at stake in an adversarial context, absolute immunity
is needed to forestall endless collateral attacks on judgments through
civil actions against the judges themselves.
Id.
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is every reason to believe that these immunities will also be retained.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In certain circumstances, citizens injured by the unconstitutional
actions of state officials may be able to recover damages under state
law in situations where they have not been able to recover under
federal law. Where a state official violates a plaintiff's rights under
the Maryland Constitution while carrying out official state policy,
the plaintiff will be able to recover, at least up to $50,000. This
result corrects a longstanding inequity under federal law which holds
a plaintiff without remedy in such a situation. Recovery may also
be had for individual constitutional violations committed by state
officials, even when the constitutional right in question had not been
clearly established at the time of the violation. This corrects an
inequity in federal law of a more recent vintage. In both cases, the
damages would be paid by the state, rather than by the official
personally, as long as the actions had been taken in the course of
the official's duties and without malice. This guarantees that unfairness to the plaintiff is not remedied at the expense of unfairness to
the state official.

